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INTRODUCTION
The establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and
the People's Republic of China on January 1, 1979 launched the long-awaited
normalization process originally undertaken as part of the Shanghai
Communiqu6 of 1972.* As in the case of the effort in 1972 to improve the
U.S.-Soviet relationship under the detente formula, the White House
announcement on December 15, 1978, that recognition was to be extended
and diplomatic relations established, evoked a variety of responses.
Moscow was restrained and guarded in its accommodation to the changed
situation, aided by the assurances contained in the Joint Communiqud of
December 15, 1978, that one of the underlying principles of the new
relationship would be avoidance of "agreements or understandings . . .
directed at other states." The reaction in Taiwan was understandably
negative given the abruptness of the announcement concerning normalization and its implications for the U.S.-Republic of China relationship,
including termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty. The predictability of
these reactions was matched by those in the United States which ranged from
dismay over the "sell-out" of Taiwan to satisfaction that the "China card" had
at last been played as the long-awaited "equalizer" in the increasingly
competitive U.S.-Soviet relationship. Support for normalization was also
voiced by those who believed that it was long overdue and would open up
new, profitable trading horizons through participation in the Chinese drive
for modernization. Faced with opposition by the "China lobby," the Carter
administration understandably encouraged positive assessment of the normalization decision.
American optimism and excitement over the new beginning tended to
raise expectations concerning the benefits of normalization. The mood
generally approximated that which followed the announcement in 1972 of
detente in the U.S.-Soviet relationship - a mood which approached euphoria
as the Nixon administration oversold the benefits of the move away from
confrontation and toward cooperation.
Two developments at the outset of normalization with the People's
Republic, however, dampened the nascent enthusiasm and tended to put the
relationship in a more realistic perspective. The January 1979 visit to the
United States of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and his insistence on linking
the United States to his anti-Soviet, anti-hegemony position, followed by the
"punitive" campaign against Vietnam, raised real questions concerning who
had played what card. To many it seemed that the benefits of using
* For an excellent selection of the documents relevant to developments in the
CHIU, CHINA AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE 212-75 (1979).

U.S.-P.R.C. relationship, see H.

triangular diplomacy in handling relations with Moscow and Peking were
being overshadowed by the exposure to involvement in the hostility and
rivalry of the Sino-Soviet split. The "China card" proved to have a cutting
edge of its own.
The second development related to the potential economic benefit to the
United States of the trading relationship, a prominent aspect of normalization. After a flurry of eye-catching commercial negotiations and deal-making,
the tempo of Chinese economic activity appreciably slowed, a reflection of the
reality of the modernization capability. The result was a sobering of the
attitude towards the economic benefits of normalization.
In many respects normalization has tended to follow the pattern of the
detente relationship with the Soviet Union.** It has the familiar trade and
cooperative aspects, including a science and technology program agreed
during the visit of Vice Premier Deng. There is no present arms control
aspect, although one can foresee potential involvement here as the P.R.C., a
member of the nuclear club, is not a party to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
The competitive aspect of the relationship is not the same, across-the-board
rivalry as in the U.S.-Soviet interface. There is, however, latent competition
and conflicting policy interests in the Far East, including the Taiwan
question which has been finessed in the present effort to nurture and develop
the relationship. Thus, many of the issues related to U.S.-Soviet d6tente arise
in the normalization context.
The Law Professor Workshop at the University of Maryland focused on
the key aspects of normalization and the related process. [Workshop Program
is appended.] Intended to enrich instruction in our law schools, it represented
an effort to provide insight into the political and legal issues generated by a
significant, contemporary U.S. foreign policy development. Specifically, the
Workshop was structured to cover the international relations and international and domestic legal aspects of normalization of the U.S.-P.R.C.
relationship.
To understand the importance attached by the United States to
normalization, it was necessary to present the official perception of the
benefits or value analysis. Moreover, because normalization impacts other
relationships, the program necessarily included coverage of Pacific and
Triangular Diplomacy, the Taiwan Issue and some of the lessons of history
for the future of those relationships. As negotiation is critical to any
relationship, attention had to be paid to what experience shows about dealing
with the P.R.C. and the stability of its internal process for implementing the
results negotiated. The internal legal order is also important because of its
relevance to such specific aspects of normalization as trade and scientific and
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technical exchanges and, of course, the Carter administration's special focus
on human rights. Domestic legal considerations related to normalization also
arise on the U.S. side from such issues as the authority of the Executive
Branch to act without the Congress in terminating the Mutual Defense
Treaty with Taiwan; the creation of a nongovernmental institutional
framework for the U.S.-Taiwan relationship; and Most Favored Nation, credit
entitlement, export control and other trade-related matters. In short, the
Workshop attempted to familiarize the participants with the broad range of
substantive and procedural issues involved in normalization. Its real
significance is that it provided a forum for distinguished specialists to lead
the discussion of those issues so soon after the event itself.
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